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What is JOMO in crypto trading?

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JOMO is that “I-was-right-about-the-market” joyful feeling after narrowly escaping a bad trade and potentially catastrophic losses.

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Are Donald Trump’s tariffs a legal house of cards?

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On Wednesday, speaking from the White House, US President Donald Trump suggested that families scale back on gifts this year.

Asked about his tariff program, the president remarked, “Somebody said, ‘Oh, the shelves are gonna be open. Well, maybe the children will have two dolls instead of 30 dolls, and maybe the two dolls will cost a couple of bucks more.’”

But the toy stores where those dolls are sold might have something to say about it. 

Earlier in the week, Mischief Toy Store in St. Paul, Minnesota joined a growing number of American small businesses suing the president over his emergency tariff plan.

Throughout April, a groundswell of lawsuits led by 13 states further challenged Trump’s ambitious tariff program. Their success or failure rests on hundreds of years of judicial policy and American constitutional law. 

The legal basis for the Trump tariffs

When Trump first announced his ambitious tariff program to the world, you might have wondered, Why is he allowed to do this? Well, he may not be. The president’s power to unilaterally impose tariffs is not rooted in the office’s constitutional Article II power. Instead, it is a delegation of authority by Congress. 

Article I of the US Constitution creates Congress, and Section 8 delegates the authority to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.” For much of the United States’ history, this is precisely what it did — through a series of colorfully named tariff programs like the Tariff of Abominations of 1828, the Dingley Tariff of 1897 and culminating in the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. 

At the time, Smoot-Hawley was widely perceived as contributing to the devastation of the Great Depression. As a consequence, Congress’s use of tariffs became viewed as corrosively political and dysregulated, spurring change.

In the early 1930s, then-President Franklin Delano Roosevelt pushed for legislation to grant his office the authority to negotiate tariffs. He argued that tariffs had wrecked the economy and that he should have the power to reduce them:

World trade has declined with startling rapidity. Measured in terms of the volume of goods in 1933, it has been reduced to approximately 70 percent of its 1929 volume; measured in terms of dollars, it has fallen to 35 percent. The drop in the foreign trade of the United States has been even sharper. Our exports in 1933 were but 52 percent of the 1929 volume, and 32 percent of the 1929 value […] a full and permanent domestic recovery depends in part upon a revived and strengthened international trade and that American exports cannot be permanently increased without a corresponding increase in imports.

Thus followed the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 (RTAA), which gave the president the power to set tariff rates, provided it came as part of a reciprocal agreement with a counterpart. This allowed the office to negotiate directly with other nations and promoted a period of liberalized trade. 

The RTAA, however, is not the law that Trump is now relying on. His tariffs are unilateral, not reciprocal, and would require another century of law to conceive. 

After the RTAA, Congress continued to delegate authority to the president through the midcentury. Notably, this included the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allowed the president to impose unilateral tariffs in response to national security threats; the Trade Act of 1974, which allowed the president to retaliate against unfair trade practices; and, crucially, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, known as IEEPA. 

Now, the IEEPA doesn’t say anything about tariffs; it is better known as the law that recent presidents have used to levy sanctions against enemy nations like Russia. It grants the president the power to respond to declared emergencies in response to “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” (the president also has the power to declare emergencies, but that comes from the National Emergencies Act, a different law) by “investigat[ing], regulat[ing], or prohibit[ing] any transactions in foreign exchange.” 

Related: Trump’s WLFI crypto investments aren’t paying off

Despite this novel application, the Trump administration has seized on the law because, unlike all other tariff statutes, it permits the president to act through executive order alone.

Throughout his young second term, Trump has used this statute to declare arbitrary tariffs on virtually all of America’s trading partners. First, declaring 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and then various large tariffs on the rest of the world.

To do so, Trump declared a “national emergency posed by the large and persistent trade deficit that is driven by the absence of reciprocity in our trade relationships and other harmful policies like currency manipulation and exorbitant value-added taxes (VAT) perpetuated by other countries.”

This was the first time a president had attempted to use the law in this way, and many legal scholars believe it is illegal.

Like flies to honey

Almost immediately after Trump’s tariffs were announced, lawsuits began to trickle in. Fearing retribution from the administration, many trade groups and major players reportedly chose to bow out of proceedings. However, California became the first state to sue on April 16, followed a week later on April 23 by a dozen other states.

There are basically two legal arguments you can make against Trump’s tariffs: (1) The IEEPA doesn’t authorize the president to implement his tariff program, and (2) it is unconstitutional for the IEEPA to delegate such broad authority to the president. 

This is exactly what California and the consortium of 12 states did — arguing that (1) the president’s actions are ultra vires — beyond his legal authority — and (2) they would violate separation of powers. 

There are a few reasons this might be true. For one, as the states identified, any action under the IEEPA must be tailored to “deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat,” and, “[t]he nearly worldwide 10 percent tariff level is wholly unconnected to the stated basis of the emergency declaration: it applies without regard to any country’s trade practices or purported threat to domestic industries.”

Second, there is a constitutional limit on Congress’s authority to delegate Article I powers to the president, known as the “nondelegation doctrine.” While in theory this could be robust, it has generally been nerfed by the obsequious Supreme Court’s past. Nonetheless, there remains an “intelligible principle test” that such delegation may only be allowed “if Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform.”

Related: If Trump fired Powell, what would happen to crypto?

In theory, if Congress had actually given the president plenary authority to fix tariffs according to his whims, it should violate this doctrine. But the Supreme Court has not struck down an executive action on these grounds since Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan in 1935.

Despite the constitutional uncertainty, the net of the arguments is broadly perceived as strong. This is why one “prominent conservative lawyer” told ABC News that plaintiffs may win in a fight against Trump:

There is a strong argument that the tariffs imposed under the IEEPA are not legal or constitutional. Under that particular statute, tariffs are not listed amongst the various actions a president can take in response to the declaration of a national emergency.

But there are some factors in the president’s favor. For one, the administration may be able to hear these claims in the US Court of International Trade (CIT), which has exclusive jurisdiction over most tariff disputes.

Appeals from this court are heard in the Federal Circuit, which is generally seen as favorable for Trump. The 12-state complaint was actually filed in this court from the outset, but California filed its complaint in the Northern District of California, which sits in the less deferential Ninth Circuit.

If Trump succeeds in removing that action to CIT, it will be an early victory for the administration.

More importantly, the administration is attempting to invoke the “political question doctrine.” In the first major Supreme Court case, 1803’s Marbury v. Madison, the Court noted that “[q]uestions, in their nature political or which are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the Executive, can never be made in this court.” Ever since then, pusillanimous courts have used the doctrine to avoid difficult questions, most notably in cases involving impeachment, foreign policy and partisan gerrymandering.

The Trump administration argued exactly this in its April 29 motion for preliminary injunction and summary judgment in the states’ AG case. Trump argues that “courts have consistently held that the President’s emergency declarations under NEA, and the adequacy of his policy choices addressing those emergencies under IEEPA, are unreviewable” and that “[t]herefore, any challenge to the fact of the emergency itself — particularly the claim that the emergency is not ‘unusual’ or ‘extraordinary’ enough, in plaintiffs’ view — is a nonjusticiable political question that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider.”

To date, no rulings hint at which side the courts are likely to prefer. The president’s track record in court has historically been poor, with a win rate of 35% in the Supreme Court during his first term, compared to an average presidential win rate of 65.2%.

The outlook for crypto

As the tariff fight has matured, the outlook for crypto is uncertain. It is a peculiarity of tariffs that they apply only to goods and not services or digital products. This has left cryptocurrency assets — intangible, borderless and often routed through offshore entities — outside the reach of traditional trade barriers.

As markets have shuddered at Trump’s policies, Bitcoin (BTC) finished April up 14% on the month. If Trump is allowed to pursue arbitrary trade policy and abide by Peter Navarro’s wish to turn the United States into a new hermit nation, it may prove the final validation to force cryptocurrency as the medium of international trade. 

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UK regulator moves to restrict borrowing for crypto investments

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The United Kingdom’s financial regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), plans to stop retail investors from borrowing money to fund their crypto investments.

According to a May 2 Financial Times report, the ban on borrowing to fund crypto purchases is one of the upcoming crypto rules by the FCA. David Geale, FCA executive director of payments and digital finance, told the FT that “crypto is an area of potential growth for the UK, but it has to be done right.” He added:

“To do that we have to provide an appropriate level of protection.”

Geale denied claims that the FCA is hostile to the crypto industry. Instead, he explained that he views the industry as offering high-risk investments with less consumer protection. “We are open for business,“ he said.

The interview follows the FCA seeking feedback on regulating the crypto market. In an attached document, the regulator noted that it is “exploring whether it would be appropriate to restrict firms from accepting credit as a means for consumers to buy cryptoassets.”

FCA crypto regulation discussion paper. Source: FCA

The FCA did not respond to Cointelegraph’s inquiry by publication.

Related: FCA releases discussion paper on crypto market transparency, abuse

FCA’s upcoming rules

The FCA aims to regulate the domestic cryptocurrency market, ruling over trading platforms, intermediaries, crypto lenders and borrowers, as well as decentralized finance (DeFi) systems. The regulator reportedly plans to introduce stricter rules for crypto services aimed at retail investors than those offered exclusively to professional or sophisticated investors.

Gale explained that the agency aims to develop a framework “that is safe and is competitive.” He said that the regulator aims to develop a regulatory regime that would attract businesses:

“If we can get the regulatory regime right it actually becomes attractive for firms. That is what we are trying to achieve.”

Related: UK’s finance watchdog defends ‘too tough’ crypto stance

The FCA lending ban

The regulator explained that its upcoming ban to restrict lending to fund consumers’ crypto purchases is motivated by a concern over “unsustainable debt, particularly if the value of their crypto asset drops and they were relying on its value to repay.” The ban would also include credit card purchases.

While 2024 FCA research showed that “the leading method of payment for cryptoassets among cryptoasset users continues to be the individual’s own disposable cash/income (72%),” it also highlights a growing trend in credit purchases. The research cites that only 6% of purchases were made on credit in 2022, but this metric climbed to 14% in 2024.

The FCA also purportedly plans to block retail investors from accessing crypto lenders and borrowers. Other concerns about the crypto market cited by the regulator include market manipulation, conflicts of interest, settlement failures, a lack of transparency, illiquidity, and unreliable trading systems.

To alleviate those issues, the regulator plans to require equal trade treatment by crypto trading platforms. Other potential rules include the enforcement of a separation between proprietary trading activities from those done for retail investors and demanding transparency on trade pricing and execution.

Trading platforms would be banned from paying intermediaries for order flow, and users of staking services would have to be reimbursed for any potential losses caused by third parties. The FCA plans to exempt DeFi systems without centralized operations, as long as they do not feature a “clear controlling person.”

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European Union to ban anonymous crypto and privacy tokens by 2027

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The European Union is set to impose sweeping Anti-Money Laundering (AML) rules that will ban privacy-preserving tokens and anonymous cryptocurrency accounts from 2027.

Under the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR), credit institutions, financial institutions and crypto asset service providers (CASPs) will be prohibited from maintaining anonymous accounts or handling privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies, such as Monero (XMR) and Zcash (ZEC).

“Article 79 of the AMLR establishes strict prohibitions on anonymous accounts […]. Credit institutions, financial institutions, and crypto-asset service providers are prohibited from maintaining anonymous accounts,” according to the AML Handbook, published by European Crypto Initiative (EUCI).

The AML Handbook. Source: EUCI

The regulation is part of a broader AML framework that includes bank and payment accounts, passbooks and safe-deposit boxes, “crypto-asset accounts allowing anonymisation of transactions,” and “accounts using anonymity-enhancing coins.”

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“The regulations (the AMLR, AMLD and AMLAR) are final, and what remains is the ‘fine print’ — aka the interpretation of some of the requirements through the so-called implementing and delegated acts,” according to Vyara Savova, senior policy lead at the EUCI.

She added that much of the implementation will come through so-called implementing and delegated acts, which are mostly handled by the European Banking Authority:

“This means that the EUCI is still actively working on these level two acts by providing feedback to the public consultations, as some of the implementation details are yet to be finalized.”

“However, the broader framework is final, so centralized crypto projects (CASPs under MiCA) need to keep it in mind when determining their internal processes and policies,” Savova said.

Related: Bitcoin volatility lowest in 563 days, Hayes predicts $1M BTC by 2028

EU to increase oversight of crypto service providers

Under the new regulatory framework, CASPs operating in at least six member states will be under direct AML supervision.

In the initial stage, AMLA plans to select 40 entities, with at least one entity per member state, according to EUCI’s AML Handbook. The selection process is set to start on July 1, 2027.

AMLA will use “materiality thresholds” to ensure that only firms with “substantial operations presence in multiple jurisdictions are considered for direct supervision.”

The thresholds include a “minimum of 20,000 customers residing in the host member state,” or a total transaction volume of over 50 million euros ($56 million).

Other notable measures include mandatory customer due diligence on transactions above 1,000 euros ($1,100).

These updates come as the EU ramps up its regulatory oversight of the crypto industry, building on previous measures such as the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA).

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